### ---A2 Technology Bad --- A2 Heidegger --- 1ar Frontlines

#### ---Critiquing technological advances are regressive and doom the environment to catastrophe --- It’s impossible to solve environmental problems without using instrumental rationality.

Bronner 2004

Stephen Eric, Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement, pg. 160

Critics of the Enlightenment may have correctly emphasized the price of progress, the costs of alienation and reification, and the dangers posed by technology and scientific expertise for nature and a democratic society. Even so, this does not justify romantic attempts to roll back technology. They conflate far too easily with ideological justifications for rolling back the in­terventionist state and progressive legislation for cleaning up the environ­ment. Such a stance also pits the Enlightenment against environmentalism: technology, instrumental rationality, and progress are often seen as inimical to preserving the planet. Nevertheless, this is to misconstrue the problem. Technology is crucial for dealing with the ecological devastation brought about by modernity. A redirection of technology will undoubtedly have to take place: but seeking to confront the decay of the environment without it is like using an umbrella to defend against a hurricane. Institutional action informed by instrumental rationality and guided by scientific specialists is unavoidable. Investigations are necessary into the ways government can in­fluence ecologically sound production, provide subsidies or tax-benefits for particular industries, fund particular forms of knowledge creation, and make “risks” a matter of public debate. It is completely correct to note that: “neither controversial social issues nor cultural concerns can be settled sim­ply by scientific fiat, particularly in a world where experts usually disagree and where science can be compromised by institutional sponsors. No labo­ratory can dictate what industrial practices are tolerable or what degree of industrialization is permissible. These questions transcend the crude cate­gories of technical criteria and slide-rule measurements.”7

### Politics-1ar link t/

#### FDI in oil and gas is popular in DC- helps the US economy.

Orol 12 (Rob, senior writer for The Deal magazine and The Daily Deal newspaper, covering the activist hedge fund industry as well as other topics, including the S.E.C. and Capitol Hill. Orol is the author of the 'Over the Hedge' column, contributor to the 'Rules of the Road' weekly column, and is also a commentator on BBC World Television, CNBC TV, Business News Network and National Public Radio, “Cnooc's big deal for Nexen seen succeeding,” MarketWatch August 16, 2012, lexis)

Lobbyists hired early Also greasing the wheels, Cnooc hired Hill+Knowlton, a prominent lobbying firm in both Ottawa and Washington, to lobby on the Nexen deal. Regulatory observers don't believe the U.K. government will raise any objections to the deal. Fournier noted that North Sea oil production is declining, a situation that is driving the British to attract capital there. He noted that in 2010 a consortium of Chinese firms purchased three U.K. electricity networks with no regulatory opposition, indicating that this deal will also likely pass regulatory muster. “The British are pretty desperate to get new capital invested in the North Sea,” he said. For Clayton, the difference between Unocal and Nexen and between 2005 and 2012 is the economy. “Today's economic context is much more conducive to this type of foreign investment winning support in Washington, even in a politically sensitive sector like oil and gas, than was the case in 2005,” he said. “North American oil production is growing more quickly than any other part of the world and companies from all over the world want in on that action.”

### Political capital =/=

#### Don’t prefer issue specific evidence, their authors distort the language of political capital

Dickinson ‘9 (Matthew, Professor of Political Science – Middlebury College and Former Professor – Harvard University, “Sotomayor, Obama, and Presidential Power”, Presidential Power: A NonPartisan Analysis of Presidential Politics, 5-26, http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/

As for Sotomayor, from here the path toward almost certain confirmation goes as follows: the Senate Judiciary Committee is slated to hold hearings sometime this summer (this involves both written depositions and of course open hearings), which should lead to formal Senate approval before Congress adjourns for its summer recess in early August. So Sotomayor will likely take her seat in time for the start of the new Court session on October 5. (I talk briefly about the likely politics of the nomination process below). What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee.